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INTRODUCTION 
Danielle Bimber (“Bimber”), a twenty-nine-year-old married mother 
of three from Pennsylvania, gave birth again in November 2003 to 
triplets.1  Bimber conceived and carried the children in her womb per 
an agreement she had entered into the previous spring with J.F., a 
sixty-two-year-old unmarried professor from Ohio.2  Bimber conceived 
the triplets via in vitro fertilization,3 using sperm from J.F. and an 
                                                          
 1. See John Horton, Legal Fight Leaves Triplets in Limbo, THE PLAIN DEALER, 
July 18, 2004, available at http://www.intendedparents.com/News/Legal_fight_ 
leaves_triplets_in_limbo.html (noting that Bimber, who did not graduate from 
college, divorced her first husband in 2000, is married to her second husband, filed 
for bankruptcy in July of 2003, and currently lives in a low-income community).  
Bimber attributes her decision to become a surrogate mother to the ease of her past 
pregnancies and her sympathy for those who are incapable of having children.  Id. 
 2. See J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 4 (2004) (stating that Bimber applied to 
serve as a surrogate mother online with a group called Surrogate Mothers, Inc. 
(“SMI”), which matched her with J.F. and his girlfriend). 
 3. See Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, Reproductive Surrogacy at the 
Millennium: Proposed Model Legislation Regulating “Non-Traditional” Gestational 
Surrogacy Contracts, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 673, 681 (2000) (explaining that in vitro 
fertilization occurs in a Petri dish, after which a doctor implants the resulting embryo 
into a woman’s uterus). 
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ovum from an egg donor in Texas.4  The agreement between Bimber 
and J.F. stipulated that once Bimber had the babies, she would 
transfer legal custody of the babies to J.F.5 
After the birth of the babies, Bimber had a change of heart and 
decided to sue for custody of the triplets in Pennsylvania.6  J.F. argued 
that Bimber did not have legal standing to sue for custody because she 
was not the children’s legal mother.7  In the case, J.F. v. D.B., the 
judge did not have any legal precedent to guide his decision because 
Pennsylvania does not have any statutes or case law addressing 
gestational surrogacy.8  As a result, the judge relied on contract law 
and public policy goals to conclude that Bimber was in fact the 
triplets’ legal mother, despite the absence of a genetic relationship.9  
Because of this status as their legal mother, Bimber had automatic 
standing to seek custody of the triplets.10  This finding is significant 
because it gave J.F., the genetic and intended father, and Bimber, a 
gestational surrogate, equal status in seeking custody of the 
children.11 
                                                          
 4. See J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 4 n.4 (noting that the egg donor was not a party 
to the matter because she was like a sperm donor, who courts often recognize as 
having forfeited their parental rights to any child resulting from his donation). 
 5. See Lillian Thomas, Triplets’ Surrogate Mom Fights to Keep Baby Boys, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 13, 2004, available at http://www.surrogacylaw.net/ 
acrobatfiles/triplets-surrogate.PDF (stating that, after the birth, Bimber anticipated 
returning home without the babies). 
 6. See J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 7-8 (noting that Bimber did not attempt to 
rescind her agreement until she became concerned about the intended parents’ 
apparent lack of interest in the triplets during the six days following their birth). 
 7. See, e.g., T.B. v. L.R.M., 753 A.2d 873, 882 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (declaring 
that only individuals with a prima facie right to custody of a child, such as legal 
parents, have standing to sue for custody). 
 8. See J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 12-13 (relying on the legislative histories of 
Pennsylvania bills that failed to become law to infer that the state prefers for courts to 
identify the surrogate mother as the legal mother in cases where the surrogacy 
contract was void). 
 9. See id. at 22-24 (finding that in the absence of any competing claims of 
motherhood, Bimber’s actions of conceiving, carrying, and caring for the children 
since birth established her status as their legal mother). 
 10. See id. (noting the possibility that even if the court ruled that Bimber was not 
the triplets’ legal mother, she still might have had standing to sue for custody under 
the legal doctrine of in loco parentis); see also Commonwealth v. Cameron, 179 A.2d 
270, 272 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962) (finding that in loco parentis confers the legal rights 
and responsibilities of a legal parent on a third party who has intentionally assumed 
the obligations of parenthood in relation to that child); Barbara White Stack, 
Surrogate Mother Gets Custody of [Three], PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 8, 2005, 
at *1, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05008/439189.stm (noting that 
when the custody dispute occurred, the Judge did, in fact, award custody to Bimber). 
 11. See generally Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 368 A.2d 635, 637 (Pa. 
1977) (declaring that Pennsylvania courts decide custody disputes between two legal 
parents by looking solely at which custody scenario serves the best interests of the 
child);  J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1319 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (indicating that in 
a custody dispute between a parent in loco parentis and a legal parent, the court 
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This Comment argues that the outcome of the Bimber case does 
not indicate a preference for a gestational motherhood standard in 
surrogacy cases in Pennsylvania.  Part I explains gestational surrogacy, 
beginning in Part IA with a brief overview of the three most 
prominent parentage standards that courts have applied to determine 
legal parentage in gestational surrogacy cases.  Part IB highlights the 
various approaches state legislatures have adopted in addressing 
gestational surrogacy arrangements.  Part IC examines existing 
parentage doctrines in Pennsylvania.  Next, Part II argues that 
applying a gestational motherhood standard in surrogacy cases in 
Pennsylvania would conflict with the language of J.F., existing 
Pennsylvania parentage laws, and the United States Constitution.  Part 
III recommends a legislative course of action for Pennsylvania by 
comparing Pennsylvania’s needs with the Uniform Parentage Act and 
statutes from other states.  This Comment concludes that 
Pennsylvania should adopt a parentage standard that favors intended 
parents in gestational surrogacy situations. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
There are two distinct types of surrogacy arrangements.12  The first, 
referred to as “traditional surrogacy,” exists when a woman 
(“surrogate”) contracts with a couple (“intended parents”) to become 
pregnant through artificial insemination and the use of her own 
egg.13  By contrast, in gestational surrogacy arrangements, the 
surrogate is not genetically related to the child.14  Instead, the 
surrogate becomes pregnant via in vitro fertilization using another 
woman’s egg.15  Typically, the intended parents provide the egg and 
                                                          
considers the parent in loco parentis a non-parent).  A non-parent must meet a 
higher burden of proof to gain custody because the courts favor placing children with 
legal parents (who are also, in most cases, biological parents).  Id. 
 12. See ROBERT BLANK & JANNA MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 109 (1995) (noting that advancements in 
reproductive technology have made gestational surrogacy possible and have created 
an attractive alternative to traditional surrogacy). 
 13. See Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction 
and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 603-04 (2002) 
(identifying the distinguishing factor between traditional and gestational surrogacy as 
the surrogate’s use of her own egg). 
 14. See Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 60 (1994) (defining a “genetic 
relationship” as one involving individuals who share blood derived from a common 
ancestor). 
 15. See Ilana Hurwitz, Collaborative Reproduction: Finding the Child in the Maze 
of Legal Motherhood, 33 CONN. L. REV. 127, 131-32 (2000) (asserting that infertility 
renders over six million women of childbearing age incapable of carrying a child to 
term and reporting that gestational surrogacy is becoming a popular solution for 
many of those women). 
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sperm.16  Sometimes intended parents may use donor eggs and/or 
sperm, which can result in as many as five individuals contributing to 
the creation of the child.17  With the role of parent divided among so 
many parties,18 courts often struggle to identify new standards of legal 
parentage that can address these confusing possibilities.19  Thus far, 
courts have applied three different approaches.20 
A.  The Judicial Response to Surrogacy: Three Standards to 
Determine Legal Parentage in Gestational Surrogacy Situations 
1.  The Legacy of In re Baby M.: A Gestational Motherhood Standard 
In 1989, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided In re Baby M., the 
first major case concerning surrogacy contracts, and laid the 
foundation for the first judicial approach to surrogacy.21  The court 
voided a traditional surrogacy contract as contrary to public policy, 
and declared the surrogate the legal mother of the child she bore.22  
More than a decade later, the New Jersey Superior Court applied this 
gestational motherhood standard articulated in In re Baby M. to a 
gestational surrogacy situation.23  The gestational motherhood 
                                                          
 16. See John Dwight Ingram, Surrogate Gestator: A New and Honorable 
Profession, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 675, 677 (1993) (explaining that the prospect of 
creating a child that is genetically related to one or both parents is what makes 
gestational surrogacy so appealing to infertile couples). 
 17. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1998) (recognizing legal parentage in the intended parents of a child who a 
gestational surrogate conceived using donor sperm and eggs). 
 18. See Storrow, supra note 13, at 602 (identifying eight potential parents in a 
gestational surrogacy situation: the egg donor and her spouse, the sperm donor and 
his spouse, the surrogate and her husband, and the intended mother and father). 
 19. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781-82 (Cal. 1993) (creating an 
intent-based test of parentage to “break the tie” between the genetic and gestational 
mothers, both of whom had a legal claim to motherhood under California law and 
were seeking custody of the child). 
 20. See generally Valerie L. Baker, Surrogacy: One Physician’s View of the Role of 
Law, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 603, 607 (1994) (identifying gestation, genetics, or intention as 
three ways to determine legal parenthood).  But see Johnson, 851 P.2d at 789 
(Kennard, J., dissenting) (arguing for recognition of a fourth standard of parentage, 
the “best interest of the child” standard); Hurwitz, supra note 15, at 171 (supporting 
the recognition of the “best interests of the child” standard of determining 
parentage). 
 21. See 537 A.2d 1227, 1264 (N.J. 1989) (settling a custody dispute between a 
traditional surrogate and the intended parents). 
 22. See id. at 1247-50 (equating traditional surrogacy contracts to selling a child, 
and finding that such agreements are contrary to the best interests of the mother, the 
child, and society). 
 23. See A.H.W. v. G.B.H., 772 A.2d 948, 953 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) 
(relying on New Jersey’s adoption statute to conclude that the gestational and legal 
mother cannot surrender her parental rights until seventy-two hours after the birth).  
However, the court also noted that because the state allows five days for completion of 
the birth certificate, the intended parents’ names can appear on the birth certificate 
5
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standard states that any woman who gestates and gives birth to a child 
is that child’s legal mother, regardless of whether she is also the 
child’s genetic mother.24  Proponents of this standard typically rely on 
both the traditional notions of motherhood and the significance of 
the gestational mother’s contribution to the fetus growing inside her 
to justify the gestational surrogate’s claim to motherhood.25 
2.  The Johnson v. Calvert Intent-Based Approach to Parentage 
In 1993, the California Supreme Court articulated a new, intent-
based standard of parentage in Johnson v. Calvert.26  This standard 
considers the couple who initiated the creation of a child, the 
“intended parents,” to be that child’s legal parents.27  However, as 
originally articulated in Johnson, intent alone did not govern.28  
Instead, the court ruled that when more than one woman has a valid 
claim of motherhood under California law the intent element 
“break[s] the tie” between the two women.29 
However, a California court has since found a valid claim of 
motherhood in an intended mother who neither supplied genetic 
material, nor gave birth to the child.30  Although, in that case, the 
intended mother was the only party seeking custody of the child, the 
                                                          
if they complete it after the seventy-two hours have passed.  Id. 
 24. See Malina Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and the Seed: Defining Motherhood 
in the Era of Assisted Human Reproduction, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 497, 524-25 (1996) 
(arguing that despite the continued support of some commentators, the gestational 
motherhood standard is outdated because it limits the reproductive choices available 
to infertile couples). 
 25. See A.H.W., 772 A.2d at 953 (claiming that a gestational mother “contributes 
an endocrine cascade that determines how the child will grow, when its cells will 
divide and differentiate in the womb, and how the child will appear and function for 
the rest of its life”). 
 26. See 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (holding that in order to apply the intent 
test, the two women involved must have statutorily recognized claims to 
motherhood).  But see John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to Be a “Parent”?  
The Claims of Biology as a Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 414 (1991) 
(advocating a pure intention test that determines parentage based solely on who 
conceptualized and implemented the procreation from the outset). 
 27. See Hurwitz, supra note 15, at 140 (noting that while courts apply contract law 
principles in the intent-based parentage analysis, their true concern is not adherence 
to contract law, but identifying the factors that motivated the creation of the child). 
 28. See 851 P.2d at 781 (arriving at the intent test only after analyzing both the 
birth mother’s and the genetic mother’s claims to maternity and finding them both 
valid). 
 29. See id. at 782 (finding that, under California law, motherhood can be 
established by either giving birth to a child or by supplying the genetic material for 
that child).  When different women perform these two functions, the one who 
intended to create the child is that child’s legal mother.  Id. 
 30. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 288 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) 
(invoking an artificial insemination statute that declared a husband the legal father of 
children born to his artificially inseminated wife because of his consent to the medical 
procedure and applying it to a gestational surrogacy situation). 
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court still had to circumvent the “tie breaker” rule to arrive at her 
status as legal mother.31  Therefore, as applied, the test appears to be 
one of pure intention that confers parental rights on parties who 
affirmatively seek to create a child. 
3.  The Belsito v. Clark Genetic Provider Standard 
The Ohio Supreme Court articulated the final judicial approach to 
gestational surrogacy disputes in Belsito v. Clark, in holding that the 
legal and natural parents of a child born to a gestational surrogate 
were those who had provided the genetic material for that child.32  
The court relied heavily on the historic notion that parentage stems 
from a “common ancestry of genetic traits.”33  In addition, the court 
found that the genetic provider standard of parentage was ultimately 
easier to apply, more aligned with public policy concerns, and more 
respectful of the rights of a genetic provider than the intent test.34  
However, because the surrogate did not seek custody, the court did 
not address the more complex gestational surrogacy questions that 
the genetic provider test would fail to resolve.35 
B.  The Legislative Response to Surrogacy 
Despite these complicated arrangements, many state legislatures, 
including Pennsylvania’s, have failed to address the gestational 
surrogacy situation.36  The states that have enacted surrogacy statutes 
                                                          
 31. See id. at 288-89 (finding the legal mother to be the woman who intended to 
bring about the creation of the child even though she was not the child’s gestational 
or genetic mother).  But see Storrow, supra note 13, at 621 (arguing that the analogy 
the Buzzanca court drew between artificial insemination and intended parenthood is 
“strained” and future courts are unlikely to apply it because society and the law both 
view gestation as more emotionally involved and more complicated than sperm 
donation). 
 32. See 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 66 (1994) (concluding that under Ohio law, the 
genetic providers would be the legal parents of any child produced by their genetic 
material unless they have waived their parental rights).  In this case, the genetic and 
intended parents sought a declaratory judgment that they were the legal parents of 
the child and would be listed on the birth certificate, contrary to existing Ohio law.  
Id.  The surrogate did not contest and did not seek custody.  Id. 
 33. See id. at 64 (relying on societal precedent to adopt the genetic provider 
standard of parentage in gestational surrogacy cases). 
 34. See id. at 62-63 (identifying the relevant public policy concerns as prohibiting 
the forced surrender of parental rights and preserving adoption law guidelines).  The 
relevant adoption statutes include the mandatory waiting period before a birth 
mother can relinquish parental rights and court approval of prospective parents.  Id. 
 35. See id. at 65 (noting that under the genetic provider test, the outcome of 
custody disputes in surrogacy arrangements that involve donated eggs and sperm 
remains uncertain because the genetic providers may maintain anonymity). 
 36. See J.F. v. D.B, 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 13 (2004) (stating that nineteen states lack 
surrogacy laws); see also Alice Hofheimer, Note, Gestational Surrogacy: Unsettling 
State Parentage Law and Surrogacy Policy, 19 N.Y.U REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 571, 584 
(1992) (attributing the absence of statutes dealing with surrogacy in these states to 
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have taken a variety of approaches.37 
Several states have adopted laws declaring surrogacy contracts 
unenforceable.38  Most of these statutes do not differentiate between 
traditional and gestational surrogacy arrangements.39  However, 
declaring surrogacy contracts unenforceable does not stop surrogacy 
arrangements from occurring; it merely creates a presumption of 
maternity in the birth mother.40  In an effort to prevent surrogacy 
arrangements from occurring altogether, Michigan enacted a 
surrogacy statute that criminalizes participation in surrogacy 
arrangements that compensate the surrogate in excess of expenses 
incurred.41 
Some states take a more flexible approach to surrogacy laws by 
enacting statutes that permit enforcement of surrogacy contracts that 
adhere to certain guidelines.  For example, some states prohibit 
payment to the surrogate in excess of expenses incurred,42 some 
require medical validation of the intended mother’s inability to 
gestate a child,43 and still others require the intended parents to 
obtain a mandatory pre-birth court order.44 
                                                          
the “simple certainty of unitary motherhood” that existed prior to the advent of in 
vitro fertilization). 
 37. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text (describing these various 
approaches to surrogacy regulation and citing laws from several states); see also Sara 
K. Alexander, Who Is Georgia’s Mother?  Gestational Surrogacy: A Formulation for 
Georgia’s Legislature, 38 GA. L. REV. 395, 398 (2003) (explaining that, unless 
Congress passes national legislation regulating surrogacy arrangements, the states 
have complete autonomy to regulate the issue). 
 38. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (2004) (prohibiting surrogacy 
arrangements and granting custody of a child born by a surrogate to the surrogate); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (West 2004) (holding surrogate agreements void as 
“against public policy”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 122, 123 (Gould 2004) (providing for 
civil penalties if parties enter into surrogacy contracts); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 
(1999) (declaring that any woman acting as a surrogate is the legal mother of any 
child born to her). 
 39. See Havins & Dalessio, supra note 3, at 686 (identifying Florida, New 
Hampshire, and Virginia as the only three states to have statutorily distinguished 
between gestational and traditional surrogacy). 
 40. See, e.g., Soos v. Super. Ct., 897 P.2d 1356, 1360-61 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) 
(demonstrating that surrogacy arrangements continue to occur in Arizona despite the 
existence of a law that prohibits enforcement of surrogacy contracts). 
 41. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.857 (West 2004) (assigning penalties of up 
to five years in prison for participants in a gestational surrogacy arrangement 
involving compensation). 
 42. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (West 2004) (voiding surrogacy 
contracts that provide compensation for a woman’s termination of her parental 
rights).  But see ALA. CODE § 26-10A-34 (1991) (prohibiting payment in exchange for 
placing children up for adoption and stating that the prohibition of payment does 
not apply to surrogacy situations). 
 43. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (2003) (permitting couples to enter into 
surrogacy contracts only if the woman is incapable of carrying a child to term or if 
doing so would risk the health of mother or child). 
 44. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (2004) (granting the intended parents legal 
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Additionally, the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”) proposes a 
statutory scheme that would hold surrogacy contracts enforceable45 as 
long as the intended parents meet certain contractual criteria46 and 
acquire court approval of the contract prior to conception.47  Four 
states have adopted the newest version of the UPA.48 
Finally, Arkansas upholds surrogacy contracts to a degree greater 
than all other states.  Arkansas is the only state to enforce a surrogacy 
contract completely and award legal parentage to one or both 
intended parents upon birth of the child.49 
C. Pennsylvania: Existing Notions of Parentage that  
May Impact the State’s Approach to Surrogacy 
Neither Pennsylvania statutes nor caselaw define the term 
“mother.”50  As a result, Pennsylvania recognizes any woman who 
gives birth as the legal mother of the child she delivers.51  Courts can 
vest a birth mother’s maternal rights in another woman only if the 
birth mother voluntarily relinquishes those rights or upon a showing 
of extreme neglect or wrongdoing.52  Neither mothers nor fathers 
                                                          
parent status as long as at least one parent can prove a genetic tie to the child and 
where a court approves the surrogacy contract prior to the child’s birth).  Otherwise, 
the gestational mother remains the legal mother unless the genetic mother is also the 
intended mother, in which case the genetic mother is the legal mother.  Id. 
 45. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 360-361 
(2000 & Supp. 2004) (expressing concern about laws that render surrogacy contracts 
void or unenforceable because they create uncertainty in the legal status of children 
born to surrogacy). 
 46. See id. § 801, 9B U.L.A. 362 (requiring both an intended mother and 
intended father be parties to the contract and reserving the gestational surrogate’s 
right to make decisions regarding her health and that of the fetus). 
 47. See id. § 803 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 365 (attributing the purpose of the court’s pre-
conception order to the state’s interest in ensuring that the parties are well suited to a 
gestational surrogacy agreement, that they understand the significance of the 
agreement, and that the interests of the child are addressed before conception). 
 48. See NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 
LEGISLATIVE FACT SHEET (2004), available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ 
uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-upa.asp (identifying Delaware, Texas, 
Washington, and Wyoming as the states that have thus far adopted the 2000 version 
of the Uniform Parentage Act). 
 49. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-10-201 (2003) (declaring that in surrogacy 
arrangements, the biological father and the intended mother are the child’s legal 
parents if they are married; the biological father alone is the legal parent if 
unmarried; and the intended mother is the legal mother if she used anonymously-
donated sperm). 
 50. See Bahl v. Lambert Farms, Inc., 819 A.2d 534, 540 (Pa. 2003) (noting that no 
one has ever contested a woman’s parentage in Pennsylvania and, as a result, there 
are no maternity counterparts to the paternity statutes). 
 51. See Hill, supra note 26, at 371 (noting that the presumption of biology grants 
legal motherhood to the birth mother in states where no case law or statute exists to 
the contrary). 
 52. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511 (2004) (identifying continued and permanent 
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can relinquish their parental rights voluntarily unless another intends 
to assume those rights by adoption.53 
In stark contrast to Pennsylvania’s approach to maternity, the state’s 
determination of paternity does not depend on biology.54  Instead, 
Pennsylvania adheres to the “presumption of paternity” doctrine, 
which holds that a man is the natural and legal father of any children 
born to his wife during their marriage.55  If another man wants to 
claim paternity of the child or the existing father wants to deny 
paternity, he must show by clear and convincing evidence that, at the 
time of conception, the husband did not have access to his wife or was 
incapable of procreation.56  Only by demonstrating one of these two 
things can an individual rebut the presumption of paternity.57  
Therefore, even if another man offers proof that he is the child’s 
biological father, Pennsylvania courts will not permit him to assert his 
parentage against the husband in an existing marriage.58 
In addition, the doctrine of paternity by estoppel applies to 
paternity disputes where a child’s mother is not married.59 Paternity 
by estoppel prohibits a father from denying his parentage if, after 
treating a child like his own, he discovers that another man is actually 
                                                          
incapacity, abuse, and neglect as reasons for termination of parental rights, and 
requiring that the court consider the development, physical and emotional needs, 
and welfare of the child above all other considerations in deciding whether to 
terminate the parent’s rights). 
 53. See Varner Petition, 68 Pa. D. & C.2d 552, 555 (1973) (noting that a parent 
may not voluntarily relinquish parental rights unless someone intends to adopt that 
child because the court cannot deprive the child of his rights vis-a-vis the parent). 
 54. See, e.g., Diane S. Kaplan, Why Truth is Not a Defense in Paternity Actions, 
10 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 69, 76 (2000) (asserting that the paternity presumptions 
actually ignore biological facts in order to protect rigid social values). 
 55. See Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. 1999) (noting that the purpose of 
the presumption of paternity doctrine is to protect the sanctity of the family unit and, 
where that unit does not exist, there is no justification for its application). 
 56. See Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 179 n.4 (Pa. 1997) (defining the “no 
access” doctrine as the inability of the husband to have sexual relations with his wife); 
see also Commonwealth ex rel. Savruk v. Derby, 344 A.2d 624, 626-27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1975) (declaring that courts can admit the testimony of the husband and wife as 
evidence of “no access”). 
 57. See Woy v. Woy, 663 A.2d 759, 760-61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (holding that 
where a married woman engaged in an extramarital affair and became pregnant, her 
extramarital boyfriend could not assert paternity because he failed to overcome the 
presumption of paternity even where he proved that the wife resided with him at the 
time of conception). 
 58. See John M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380, 1388 (Pa. 1990) (declaring that 
genetic testing could not overcome the presumption of paternity when the third 
party, who was seeking to establish paternity, failed to prove that the husband had no 
access to his wife or was biologically incapable of fathering the child). 
 59. See Fish, 741 A.2d at 724 (justifying application of paternity by estoppel on 
the child’s interest in knowing the identity of his parents and avoiding the pain of 
discovering that someone believed to be his father is not his father). 
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the child’s biological father.60  The doctrine applies any time a man 
acts as a father to a child and holds that child out as his own, 
regardless of whether or not the father is aware that he is not the 
child’s biological father.61  However, despite these paternity policies 
that disregard biology, Pennsylvania courts accept the existence of a 
genetic relationship as proof of paternity when a child is born to an 
unmarried mother and no father is present.62 
Furthermore, Pennsylvania courts have conferred some parental 
rights, namely the right to seek custody or visitation, to third parties 
standing in loco parentis.63  Courts permit third parties to intrude on 
the rights of natural parents when the third party’s actions create a 
relationship with a child that is sufficient to warrant visitation or 
custody rights.64  Recently, courts have applied this doctrine to 
establish visitation and custody rights for gay and lesbian partners.65 
Finally, although Pennsylvania has no laws concerning surrogacy, 
the Department of Health has adopted a gestational surrogacy 
policy.66  The policy permits hospitals to issue a child’s birth 
certificate bearing the names of the intended parents.67  However, the 
                                                          
 60. See id. (finding that paternity by estoppel also holds a mother to her own 
actions regarding the paternity of a child by precluding her from challenging the 
paternity of the man she has held out as the child’s father or seeking to establish 
paternity in another man). 
 61. See J.C. v. J.S., 826 A.2d 1, 3-5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (precluding a father from 
denying paternity where he believed he was the child’s biological father for eight 
years and, after learning the truth, continued to act as the father of the child).  But 
see Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279, 1285 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (permitting a father to 
deny parentage where a mother fraudulently told him that he was the child’s father 
and the father could prove that he would have ceased to act as a father to the child 
had he known the truth). 
 62. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4343 (2004) (stating that at the request of any party 
to an action to establish paternity, the court can order genetic testing to establish 
paternity). 
 63. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (explaining in loco parentis 
and the elevated burden of proof a non-parent must meet to receive custody over the 
claims of a parent). 
 64. See J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1321-22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (finding 
that a third party had standing in loco parentis where she consented to the 
pregnancy, participated in the pregnancy beginning immediately after conception, 
lived with the child after birth, and acted as a parenting partner to the child’s 
mother). 
 65. See T.B. v. L.R.M., 753 A.2d 873, 882 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (finding that the 
birth mother’s lesbian lover had standing to seek custody based on her actions in loco 
parentis). 
 66. See PA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, POLICY & PROCEDURE FOR ASSISTED CONCEPTION 
BIRTH REGISTRATIONS (2003) [hereinafter PA. SURROGACY POL’Y] (on file with author) 
(explaining that the intended parents must complete the assisted birth form and take 
it to a judge who, if willing, will sign the order and send it to the Division of Vital 
Records so that all certified copies of the birth certificate will reflect the intended 
parents’ legal parentage). 
 67. See id. (indicating that the intended parents are the mother and father who 
will have legal custody of the child, regardless of whether the intended parents 
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state did not enact this procedure by statute and therefore it is not 
binding on the courts.68 
II.  ANALYSIS 
The outcome of J.F. appears to establish a preference for a 
gestational motherhood standard in Pennsylvania because the court 
held that the gestational surrogate was the triplets’ legal mother.69  
However, the court’s analysis, existing parentage constructs, and 
constitutional scrutiny all pose problems to that interpretation of the 
case’s outcome.70  In fact, a much stronger case exists for arguing that 
the court’s application of law and public policy actually comports with 
adoption of an “intended parents” standard.71 
A. The Court’s Reliance on Contract Terms Demonstrates that a 
Gestational Motherhood Standard in Pennsylvania Would  
Violate the Court’s Desire to Recognize the Intended  
Parents as Legal Parents Where Possible 
The court’s reliance on contract law principles in J.F. strongly 
contradicts any interpretation of the outcome that would encourage 
adoption of a gestational motherhood standard.72  In surrogacy 
situations, when courts apply a gestational motherhood standard of 
parentage, the contract terms are irrelevant.73  The state relies on its 
presumptive standards of motherhood and thereby renounces the 
contract terms.74 
                                                          
donated genetic material for the child). 
 68. See Lawrence Kalikow, Esq., Surrogacy and the Law of Pennsylvania (Apr. 
1999), available at http://www.opts.com/penn.htm (observing that despite the fact 
that the courts are not bound to approve this procedure, judges in fifteen counties 
have issued the requisite pre-birth orders). 
 69. See Christopher Lilienthal, Surrogate Wins Standing in Erie Custody Dispute: 
Contract to Carry Children Rejected on Policy Grounds, PA. L. WKLY., May 5, 2004, at 
*1 (quoting Pittsburgh attorney Thomas M. Mulroy as suggesting that the birth 
mother is presumptively entitled to custody of the triplets). 
 70. See id. (noting that attorney Mark Momjian speculated whether the outcome 
would have differed if J.F.’s girlfriend had donated her own eggs or if J.F. had been 
married). 
 71. See id. (quoting Pennsylvania surrogacy law attorney Lawrence Kalikow as 
suggesting that because of the unusual facts of the case, it likely will have little 
precedential value). 
 72. See J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 17-19 (2004) (analyzing the surrogacy 
contract, and noting that problems in the contract and the contract’s failure to 
identify the triplets’ legal mother posed a barrier to enforcement of the contract). 
 73. See Anne Reichman Schiff, Solomonic Decisions in Egg Donation: 
Unscrambling the Conundrum of Legal Maternity, 80 IOWA L. REV. 265, 271-72 
(1995) (noting that the gestational standard of maternity arises from the historically 
strong presumption of maternity and that this precludes the contractually recognized 
mother from any claim to maternity). 
 74. See Andrea E. Stumpf, Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New 
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In J.F., although the court named the surrogate as the triplets’ legal 
mother, it did not renounce the contract.75  In fact, the court closely 
inspected the contract terms and, pursuant to the contract, identified 
J.F. as the triplets’ legal father.76  One can reconcile this apparent 
inconsistency by interpreting the court’s decision as favoring an 
“intended parents” standard.77 
First, the “intended parents” standard is the only surrogate 
parentage standard that looks to the contract as evidence of 
parentage.78  In this respect, the court’s analysis comports with the 
“intended parents” standard.79  Furthermore, while the court voided 
the contract in J.F. as contrary to public policy, it did not hold all 
surrogacy contracts void as contrary to public policy.80  Holding so 
probably would have created a bias in favor of the gestational or 
genetic mother, because courts would not feel at liberty to rely on a 
prohibited contract to prove intent.81  The court, therefore, declined 
the simplest and most direct method of creating a gestational 
standard.82 
Instead, the court invalidated the contract in J.F. because it 
contained one fatal flaw—it failed to identify the triplets’ legal 
                                                          
Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 202 (1986) (arguing that once the 
embryo is implanted in the surrogate, a surrogate’s fundamental right to privacy 
shields the pregnancy and resulting child from the contract requirements). 
 75. See J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 17 (opting to look at and analyze the contract 
terms). 
 76. See id. at 18 (noting that J.F. is, by contract, the children’s father and legally 
responsible for the children unless a paternity test proves that they are not his). 
 77. See John M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380, 1385-89 (Pa. 1990) (demonstrating 
that where a married woman gives birth to the child, her husband is the presumptive 
father of the child, and only by proving the husband’s non-access or infertility can a 
third party overcome that presumption).  But see Commonwealth ex rel. Savruk v. 
Derby, 344 A.2d 624, 626-27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (announcing that a wife’s 
testimony can serve as evidence of non-access). 
 78. See Hill, supra note 26, at 415-16 (arguing for application of a parentage 
standard that relies on contract principles and holds participating parties to their 
promises because the intended parents rely to their financial and emotional 
detriment on the promises of the surrogate). 
 79. See J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 17 (describing the contract terms). 
 80. See id. at 33 (voiding one surrogacy contract as contrary to a public policy 
concern that requires two identifiable parents for each child). 
 81. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 289 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) 
(noting that, even where a court declines to specifically enforce a surrogacy contract, 
the parentage claim of the intended parents still relies on the intent expressed in the 
contract); see also Hurwitz, supra note 15, at 140-41 (arguing that courts do not 
necessarily look to the specific contract terms as much as they look to the contract for 
evidence of preconception intent). 
 82. Cf. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1250 (N.J. 1989) (voiding the surrogacy 
contract and declaring that in all birth situations the woman who gives birth is the 
legal mother). 
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mother.83  Had the contract named a legal mother, the surrogate 
would never have had any rights to “bargain away.”84  Therefore, the 
court would have been unable to invalidate the contract on the 
grounds that permitting a parent to bargain away her parental rights 
was contrary to public policy.85 
The public policy rationale behind prohibiting a parent to bargain 
away his or her parental rights is that doing so denies the child his or 
her right to seek parental custody or support from two individuals.86  
Pennsylvania courts have, however, permitted the enforcement of 
contracts that release a parent from his or her parental obligations 
when the contract “is fair and reasonable, made without fraud or 
coercion, and without prejudice to the welfare of the child.”87  In 
these cases, courts have held that where a natural parent bargains 
away his or her parental responsibilities and another contractually 
assumes those responsibilities, there is no prejudice to the welfare of 
the child.88  Therefore, had the contract in J.F. provided for two 
identifiable parents instead of only one, the public policy concern 
would not have applied.89 
Additionally, the court explicitly identified J.F. as the child’s father 
based on the contract terms.90  The court failed to acknowledge any 
                                                          
 83. See J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 19-20 (noting that J.F.’s girlfriend was not a party 
to the action because the contract did not name her as legal mother and she was not 
genetically related to the children). 
 84. See id. at 23-24 (declaring Bimber the legal mother only after noting that the 
contract failed to identify a legal mother and no other viable claim of motherhood 
existed in this particular case). 
 85. See, e.g., T.B. v. L.R.M., 753 A.2d 873, 882 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (declaring 
that legal parents have a prima facie right to custody); see also Johnson v. Calvert, 851 
P.2d 776, 786 (Cal. 1993) (noting that where a court identifies the gestational 
surrogate as something other than the legal mother, she cannot have the 
constitutional rights of a legal mother). 
 86. See Mallinger v. Mallinger, 175 A.2d 890, 891 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961) (declaring 
that courts need not enforce contracts to bargain away child support or custody 
obligations because children are not property); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 191 cmt. a (1981) (noting that a court will not enforce agreements on 
the custody of a child unless the agreement is consistent with the child’s best 
interest). 
 87. See Commonwealth v. Cameron, 179 A.2d 270, 272 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962) 
(holding a contract enforceable where a father bargained away his parental duty to 
support because the contract provided that the natural mother and a third party 
would accept financial responsibility for the child). 
 88. See id. at 273 (guarding the welfare of the child by explaining that if the two 
people who contracted to assume parental responsibilities no longer can provide the 
necessary financial support to the child, then the court will revive the natural parent’s 
obligations). 
 89. See J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 4 (noting that Bimber contacted SMI of her own 
volition and volunteered her services as a surrogate prior to meeting J.F., which 
strongly indicates a lack of coercion or fraud). 
 90. See id. at 23 (stating that the contract identified J.F. as the legal father of the 
triplets, but it left the triplets with no means of identifying a legal mother). 
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claim of legal motherhood in favor of Bimber that relied on gestation, 
only mentioning her role as gestator in tandem with her role as 
nurturer in the days after the babies’ birth.91  This suggests that the 
court placed equal emphasis on her roles during the babies’ gestation 
and after.  Therefore, even though the court named Bimber as the 
legal mother, the court’s reliance on the contract terms strongly 
indicates that it did not do so solely based on the gestational 
motherhood standard or her status as the gestational mother. 
B. The State’s “Paramount” Interest: A Gestational  
Surrogacy Standard Would Violate Pennsylvania’s Judicially  
Recognized Interest in Preserving the Family Unit 
1.  Application of the Rationale Behind Paternity by Presumption 
In J.F., the court noted the relevance of the paternity by estoppel 
doctrine without expressly adopting a maternity by estoppel rule.92  
However, Pennsylvania courts have noted that the presumption of 
paternity supercedes the doctrine of paternity by estoppel; paternity 
by estoppel only should apply where the presumption of paternity 
cannot.93 
Courts have acknowledged that the presumption of paternity is one 
of the strongest presumptions in Pennsylvania law due to the 
“paramount” state interest in supporting and encouraging the 
continuance of stable family units.94  Because the court in J.F. applied 
the reasoning of paternity by estoppel, future courts likely would 
apply the reasoning behind the state’s stronger paternity doctrine, the 
presumption of paternity, where possible.95  Therefore, if J.F. had 
been married to his girlfriend, the court likely would not have named 
Bimber as the legal mother and would have applied the rationale 
behind the paternity presumption to identify the triplets’ mother as 
                                                          
 91. See id. at 23-24 (emphasizing that Bimber carried the children in her womb, 
took them home, and cared for them after birth). 
 92. See id. at 21 (noting that if paternity by estoppel exists because a child should 
know his father, then the idea that a child should know his mother would also 
support a theory of maternity by estoppel). 
 93. See, e.g., Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 180 (Pa. 1997) (noting that the legal 
analysis in paternity cases is twofold: first, the court must look to see if the 
presumption of paternity applies and second, if the presumption does not exist or has 
been rebutted, the court examines the possibility of paternity by estoppel). 
 94. See id. at 180 n.7 (stating that the presumed father, the institution of 
marriage, and the state of Pennsylvania all have a “paramount” interest in the 
continued application of the paternity by estoppel doctrine). 
 95. See Freedman v. McCandless, 654 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. 1995) (identifying the 
justification for applying paternity by estoppel as “achieving fairness as between the 
parents by holding them, both mother and father, to their prior conduct regarding 
the paternity of child.” (quoting Gulla v. Fitzpatrick, 596 A.2d 851, 856 (1991))). 
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J.F.’s wife.96 
Additionally, had the court truly desired to adopt a gestational 
surrogacy standard, the court would have named Bimber as the 
children’s legal mother and her husband as their father due to the 
presumption of paternity.97  Instead, the court first recognized J.F. as 
the legal father based on the contract terms and his genetic 
contribution, then sought to identify a legal mother.98  The court did 
not apply the presumption of paternity to Bimber’s husband, because 
it did not recognize her legal status as mother based on her role as 
gestator.99  Rather, the court derived her legal status as mother from 
principles of estoppel.100  Therefore, the outcome of the court’s 
analysis should not be interpreted as establishing a gestational 
motherhood standard.  Such an interpretation would contradict 
Pennsylvania’s “paramount” public policy goals. 
Furthermore, not only does application of the presumption of 
paternity doctrine indicate that the court did not apply a gestational 
motherhood standard, it also supports the adoption of an intended 
parents standard.101  The presumption of paternity derives its strength 
from Pennsylvania’s interest in preserving existing family units.102  
Pennsylvania courts recognize this interest as “paramount” and the 
presumption is extremely difficult to overcome.103  Commentators 
                                                          
 96. See J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 24 (asserting that J.F.’s girlfriend could not be 
the children’s legal mother because she was not genetically related to them nor was 
she married to their father).  But see Lilienthal, supra note 69, at *1 (quoting James 
H. Richardson, a managing partner at the firm representing J.F. and his girlfriend, 
stating that the girlfriend clearly had intended to parent the triplets and had planned 
on adopting them). 
 97. See Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 179 (declaring that in situations where a child is 
born into an intact marriage and the marriage remains intact, the presumption of 
paternity applies). 
 98. See J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 23-24 (stating that the contract clearly provides a 
legal father for the triplets, but that the court must determine the identity of the 
triplets’ mother). 
 99. See id. (noting that Bimber’s actions form the basis for her motherhood more 
so than her biological connection to them as their surrogate mother). 
 100. See id. (comparing Bimber’s actions, such as carrying the triplets, birthing 
them, and taking them home and caring for them, to similar post-birth actions that 
give rise to paternity by estoppel). 
 101. See Lori Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for 
Surrogate Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343, 2344 (1995) (arguing that contract law 
principles can “bend to accommodate” intangible interests that come into play in 
surrogacy situations). 
 102. See Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 179 (declaring that the presumption of paternity no 
longer applies in situations where the marriage is no longer intact). 
 103. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (explaining that a person can 
defeat the presumption of paternity only by proving that the presumed father did not 
have access to his wife at the time of conception or that he was incapable of 
procreation).  But see Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 182 (Nigro, J., dissenting) (arguing for a 
less strict application of the presumption of paternity that would permit rebuttal of 
the presumption based on blood test results). 
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have noted that one of the weaknesses in a gestational surrogacy 
standard is that it recognizes legal parentage in two people who are, 
in almost every case, not members of the same family unit.104  In fact, 
sometimes they are virtual strangers who may live in different 
states.105  When an existing family unit seeks to create a child, 
prepares financially and emotionally for the child, and provides a 
home for the child, splitting custody between two households would 
contradict Pennsylvania’s stated public policy interest in preserving 
family units.106  The most direct way to avoid the risk of splitting 
custody between two families (which almost always occurs when courts 
apply a gestational motherhood standard) is for Pennsylvania to apply 
an “intended parents” standard.107 
Application of the rationale behind Pennsylvania’s strongest 
presumptions indicates that a gestational surrogacy standard would 
violate the state’s interests.108  In this case, the court could not apply 
the presumption because the intended father was not married.109  
Therefore, the court likely would have relied on the presumption to 
hold J.F. and his wife, had he been married, as the children’s parents 
to keep within the state’s statutory presumptions.110 
2.  Paternity by Estoppel and In Loco Parentis: Recognition of 
Parentage Based on Action Rather Than Biology 
A gestational motherhood standard also would run afoul of 
Pennsylvania’s application of two additional doctrines, paternity by 
                                                          
 104. See Baker, supra note 20, at 608 (noting that conferring parental rights on a 
gestational surrogate and a genetic father creates a “confusing situation” that conflicts 
with Supreme Court precedent that recognizes the sanctity of the family above the 
rights of genetic parents). 
 105. See J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 1-6 (explaining that J.F. resides in Ohio, Bimber 
resides in Pennsylvania, and that SMI, an Indiana corporation, connected them). 
 106. See Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 180-81 (failing to recognize non-married couples as 
part of a “family unit,” and insisting that if the couple is not married, the presumption 
of paternity cannot apply). 
 107. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1235 (N.J. 1989) (demonstrating that some 
courts also may uphold a presumptive father’s contractual promise to rebut the 
presumption in surrogacy contracts).  The New Jersey Supreme Court accepted the 
surrogate’s husband’s rebuttal of the presumption and recognized the legal paternity 
of the genetic father.  Id. 
 108. See Larry Gostin, A Civil Liberties Analysis of Surrogacy Arrangements, 17 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 432, 446-47 (2001) (acknowledging the likelihood that, 
where policy deems the gestational mother and biological father as legal parents, 
custody battles will ensue and the court will have to decide where the child’s best 
interests lie). 
 109. See supra note 106 (explaining that the presumption of paternity only applies 
when an intact marriage exists). 
 110. See Lilienthal, supra note 69, at *1 (referring to Pennsylvania surrogacy 
expert Lawrence Kalikow’s suspicion that the marital status of J.F. and his girlfriend 
was a significant factor in the court’s analysis). 
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estoppel and in loco parentis, because both of these doctrines focus 
on parental actions rather than biology to determine parentage.111  
First, the rationale behind paternity by estoppel is not directly 
applicable to gestational surrogacy situations because the situations in 
which courts apply paternity by estoppel are significantly different 
from the facts of a gestational surrogacy dispute.112  In paternity by 
estoppel cases, the court prohibits a father, who has developed a 
relationship with a child, from denying the rights and responsibilities 
arising from that relationship.113  In gestational surrogacy, however, 
the court denies intended parents the chance to develop a 
relationship with the child by declaring the gestational surrogate the 
legal mother.114  However, the rationale behind paternity by estoppel 
does not apply in gestational surrogacy situations, because the dispute 
in gestational surrogacy arises at the moment the surrogate gives 
birth; there is no time for the child to develop expectations or 
emotional ties that would cause the child to suffer if severed.115 
Paternity by estoppel is relevant, however, as it indicates 
Pennsylvania’s willingness to recognize the limitations of biology in 
terms of defining parentage.116  This applies to gestational surrogacy 
because the intended parents may not have a genetic tie to the child, 
but the surrogate will have gestated the child, which creates a 
traditionally recognized biological link.117  In other cases, the 
                                                          
 111. See L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872, 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (declaring that 
the relationship between in loco parentis and paternity by estoppel is such that where 
a third party asserts that she has established a relationship with a child in loco 
parentis for the purpose of pursuing custody or visitation, she is thereby estopped 
from denying her duty to support the child). 
 112. See Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721, 724 (Pa. 1999) (noting that the underlying 
concern in paternity by estoppel cases is preventing children from experiencing the 
trauma associated with discovering that one “parent” that a child loved, trusted, and 
relied upon is not his parent). 
 113. See id. (estopping a mother from seeking child support from her son’s 
biological father where the son continued to believe that her ex-husband was his 
father). 
 114. See, e.g., A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 954 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2000) (holding 
that, because New Jersey has no statute dealing with maternity and holds surrogacy 
contracts unenforceable, the hospital should place the gestational surrogate’s name 
on the birth certificate to keep with the state’s maternity laws). 
 115. See Hill, supra note 26, at 402-03 (arguing that the child suffers no harm 
when separated from the gestational surrogate after birth); see also Marsha Garrison, 
Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of 
Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 913 (2000) (asserting that claims of 
parentage based on doctrines such as the presumption of paternity and paternity by 
estoppel do not apply to the surrogate in gestational surrogacy situations, because she 
has not had the time to develop a relationship with the child). 
 116. See Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 179-80 (Pa. 1997) (holding that paternity 
by estoppel prohibits parents from making paternity claims based on biology that 
would trump paternity claims based on actions). 
 117. See Hurwitz, supra note 15, at 157-58 (noting that the surrogate mother 
makes a biological contribution to the child, but recognizing that the strength of the 
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intended parents will be the genetic parents of a child, but still will 
lack the traditionally recognized “birth” factor.118  In both situations, 
the rationale behind paternity by estoppel suggests that Pennsylvania 
is prepared to recognize that the actions of the intended parents form 
the basis for their parentage.119 
Second, the doctrine of in loco parentis also expresses the state’s 
readiness to look beyond mere biology to establish parental rights.120  
This reflects the court’s recognition of parental rights in individuals 
not genetically related to the child.121  Applied to gestational 
surrogacy, this willingness to look beyond the out-dated constraints of 
biology favors the intended parents.122  In J.F., the judge applied the 
doctrine of in loco parentis to Bimber, noting that even if the court 
refused to identify her as the triplets’ legal mother, she still would 
have had standing in loco parentis to seek custody.123  Because a 
parent in loco parentis, by definition, is not a biological parent, this 
further establishes that the outcome of this case did not create a 
gestational motherhood standard.124 
3.  Assisted Conception Birth Procedure: Acceptance of an Agency 
Policy that Already Recognizes the Rights of Intended Parents 
Finally, at least one state agency in Pennsylvania already recognizes 
the rights of intended parents.125  Through a Department of Health 
                                                          
contribution is insufficient to establish legal motherhood). 
 118. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (explaining different 
gestational surrogacy arrangements). 
 119. See Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. 1999) (relying on actions rather 
than biology to define legal parentage, and prohibiting a man who acted like a father 
to a child from denying his paternity). 
 120. See J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1320 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) 
(acknowledging that courts often find that step-parents have standing in loco parentis 
because they develop a parent-like relationship with the child through the course of 
living with that child). 
 121. See Laurence Nolan, Legal Strangers and the Duty to Support: Beyond the 
Biological Tie—But How Far Beyond the Marital Tie?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 20 
(2000) (characterizing the in loco parentis relationship as voluntarily created, and 
arguing that the existence of a marital tie is insignificant). 
 122. See J.A.L., 682 A.2d at 1322 n.5 (finding that third parties can establish a 
relationship in loco parentis in as short a period of time as ten months because it is 
relative to the circumstances of the case, such as the amount of time that has passed 
since the child’s birth). 
 123. See J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 24 (2004) (stating that Bimber likely 
would have standing in loco parentis based on her role in gestating and caring for the 
triplets). 
 124. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 803 (8th ed. 1999) (noting that a parent in loco 
parentis is someone other than a natural parent who acts in place of a natural 
parent). 
 125. See PA. SURROGACY POL’Y, supra note 66 (noting that the Pennsylvania 
Department of Health’s Assisted Birth Policy allows for the placement of the intended 
parents’ names on the birth certificate). 
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policy, the state permits the Department of Vital Records to issue 
birth certificates bearing the names of the intended parents.126  This 
program is the most direct evidence so far of the state’s willingness to 
recognize parentage based on something other than gestation or 
biology, namely intent.127 
C.  Adoption of a Gestational Motherhood Standard  
Would Not Withstand Constitutional Scrutiny 
1.  Unconstitutionality on Due Process Grounds 
Aside from offending Pennsylvania state laws and policy goals, a 
gestational motherhood standard in gestational surrogacy cases would 
also run contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.128  The Due Process Clause prohibits the government 
from arbitrarily infringing upon people’s rights.129  Furthermore, in 
interpreting the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has classified 
certain rights as “fundamental” and afforded those rights a 
heightened level of protection from government intrusion.130 
One right that the Supreme Court deems fundamental is the right 
to privacy.131  While the Court has never defined the outer limits of 
this right, the Court has ruled that the right to privacy protects 
decisions regarding marriage,132 procreation,133 contraception,134 
                                                          
 126. See Letter from Stephen Tompkins, Senior Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, 
Pennsylvania Department of Health (Oct. 28, 2004) (on file with author) (asserting 
that Pennsylvania courts have issued orders directing Vital Records to recognize 
intended parents as the legal parents in 167 gestational surrogacy cases since 1994). 
 127. But see id. (noting that because the policy is not mandatory, several judges in 
various counties refuse to issue the assisted conception birth orders recognizing 
intended parents as legal parents on birth certificates). 
 128. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that no state shall deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of the laws). 
 129. See generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONST. L., § 
14.6 (6th ed. 2000) (explaining the history and significance of the Due Process 
Clause). 
 130. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (defining fundamental rights as 
those rights that, if denied, would “violat[e] the fundamental principles of liberty and 
justice which lie at the base of all our political and civil institutions” (quoting Hebert 
v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926))); see, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 
373 (1927) (declaring freedom of speech a fundamental right); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (identifying the right to privacy as a 
fundamental right); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 639 (1969) (recognizing the 
right to travel as a fundamental right). 
 131. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. 
 132. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that state law 
prohibiting interracial marriage violates the right to privacy). 
 133. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that forced 
sterilization violates the fundamental right to procreate). 
 134. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (declaring that a ban on 
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and abortion.135  Evidently, within the right to privacy, courts have 
recognized a right to use medical and technological advances to 
prevent pregnancy.136  Therefore, it follows that the Court also should 
recognize an individual’s right to use similar advances in creating a 
pregnancy.137  As one federal district court has noted, “[i]t takes no 
great leap of logic to see that within the cluster of constitutionally 
protected choices that includes the right to have access to 
contraceptives, there must be included within that cluster the right to 
submit to a medical procedure that may bring about, rather than 
prevent, pregnancy.”138  Although infertile couples need to take 
additional steps in order to become parents such as securing a 
medical center, potentially procuring eggs or sperm, and identifying a 
surrogate, these steps are simply part of the procreative process that 
the right to privacy protects.139  Therefore, the state cannot infringe 
on an infertile couple’s right to become parents any more than it can 
on a fertile couple’s right to do so.140  Yet, a gestational motherhood 
standard would deny infertile couples the opportunity to become 
parents by presumptively bestowing their right to legal parentage on 
the surrogate and, if married, on her husband.141 
In order to infringe on a right that the Court recognizes as 
                                                          
the sale of contraceptives to unmarried couples violates an individual’s right to 
privacy). 
 135. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 136. See SCOTT RAE, THE ETHICS OF COMMERCIAL SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: BRAVE 
NEW FAMILIES? 16-17 (1994) (recognizing both the freedom to procreate, which 
involves birth control decisions made prior to conception, and freedom in 
procreation, which involves “pregnancy management decisions,” such as abortion). 
 137. See id. at 17 (arguing that the broad language that the Supreme Court used in 
its decisions such as Eisenstadt supports the argument that these decisions also 
protect non-coital reproduction). 
 138. See Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (invalidating 
an Illinois law that would prohibit one particular type of fertility treatment on the 
grounds that the law interfered with the constitutionally protected right to freedom 
from government interference in matters of childbearing). 
 139. See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, 
Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 428 (1983) (arguing that “because 
fertile married persons have the right to add children to the family, infertile married 
persons must have it as well: a legal distinction based on the natural lottery of physical 
equipment is not reasonable”). 
 140. See RAE, supra note 136, at 18 (arguing that it would constitute discrimination 
based on gender if the courts denied infertile couples the same rights afforded fertile 
couples). 
 141. See J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1289 (D. Utah 2003) (striking down a 
statute that declared a gestational surrogate the legal mother of any child born to her 
on the grounds that it burdened an infertile woman’s ability to make procreative 
choices and thereby infringed on her constitutional right to privacy); see also Gary N. 
Skoloff & Edward J. O’Donnell, Is Surrogate Parenting the “Cure” for Society’s 
Infertility “Epidemic”?, NAT’L. L.J., Nov. 2, 1987, at 18 (asserting that parentage 
statutes that do not address surrogacy arrangements specifically infringe upon the 
infertile couple’s constitutional right to procreate). 
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fundamental, the state must meet the very high burden of strict 
scrutiny.142  To survive strict scrutiny, a state’s regulation must be 
narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.143  Therefore, 
even if Pennsylvania sought to establish a gestational motherhood 
standard, it is doubtful that the state could prove that a gestational 
surrogacy standard for motherhood serves a compelling state 
interest.144  For example, the state could argue that protecting the 
best interests of the child is a sufficiently compelling interest.145  
However, it is unlikely that the Court would consider this a 
“compelling” interest because there is no identifiable harm in placing 
children with intended parents.146  Therefore, the state’s ability to 
infringe on parental rights begins only after a court deems that parent 
“unfit.”147  It is even less likely that a court would recognize a state’s 
interest in protecting the surrogate because adults retain the 
responsibility of making their own choices.148  Additionally, a court 
likely would not recognize the state’s compelling interest in 
protecting the family unit in this context because the government 
permits behavior that is at odds with society’s accepted values.149 
                                                          
 142. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (stating that 
“[w]here there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may 
prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling.”). 
 143. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1965) (Goldberg, J., 
concurring) (explaining that a law that prevents people from using birth control pills 
or devices is unconstitutional, because the state’s interest in preventing extra-marital 
relations is too slight to be considered “compelling” and the law, which also affects 
married couples, sweeps too broadly in its prohibition). 
 144. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 767 
(2d ed. 2002) (noting that while the Supreme Court has never defined what criteria 
are necessary for an interest to qualify as “compelling,” the Court traditionally has 
only recognized interests that are truly vital as sufficient to withstand strict scrutiny). 
 145. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (noting that the state 
may infringe on a parent’s right to make decisions regarding his or her child in order 
to protect the child’s well being); see also Commonwealth v. Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151, 
1156 (Pa. 2000) (identifying the health and welfare of minors as a compelling state 
interest sufficient to overcome the right to privacy in matters of childrearing). 
 146. See RAE, supra note 136, at 23 (noting the lack of evidence of potential harm 
to children resulting from gestational surrogacy situations in which an intended or 
genetic mother, rather than a gestational mother, raises the child); see also Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000) (noting that where a “fit” parent exists, the state 
cannot infringe on that parent’s right to make determinations of the child’s best 
interests, even if it disagrees with those determinations). 
 147. See MARCIA MOBILIA BOUMIL, LAW, ETHICS AND REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 55 
(1994) (distinguishing surrogacy cases from “best interest of the child” 
determinations on the ground that the former involve identifying parents while the 
latter involve deciding between the desires of two parties with competing interests as 
to the child). 
 148. See RAE, supra note 136, at 19-20 (noting that the state has no responsibility 
to protect adults from “the folly of their choices” and no justification for restricting an 
adult’s ability to engage in risky behavior). 
 149. See RICHARD T. HULL, ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES 14 (1990) (asserting that the state cannot prevent the exercise of 
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Furthermore, arguments for regulating non-coital reproduction on 
religious, moral, or societal grounds due to concerns about biology, 
technology, or reproduction also would not suffice as a compelling 
state interest because, in the case of surrogacy, none of those 
concerns are justified by harm to another individual.150  One scholar 
has noted that the Supreme Court established, in the same cases that 
espouse the existence of a fundamental right to procreate, that the 
state’s ability to “enforce or impose morality stops at the threshold of 
another person’s fundamental rights.”151 
Even if a court recognized the state’s interest as sufficiently 
compelling, a gestational motherhood standard is, by no means, 
narrowly tailored.152  The gestational mother would be identified as 
the legal mother in each and every case, without due regard to which 
potential parent would serve the best interests of the child.153  
Therefore, a gestational motherhood standard would be 
unconstitutional because it would restrict the rights of infertile 
couples to engage in procreation in situations where the infertile 
couple could better serve the needs of the child than the surrogate.154 
2.  Unconstitutionality on Equal Protection Grounds 
Even if the Court failed to recognize the procreative rights of the 
intended parents as a fundamental right, a gestational motherhood 
standard in a gestational surrogacy situation likely would still fail 
constitutional review on Equal Protection grounds.155  The Equal 
                                                          
rights just because the outcome of the exercise would conflict with recognized social 
values). 
 150. See id. (noting that state concerns that do not pose a tangible threat of harm 
to others cannot justify the government’s intrusion on fundamental rights). 
 151. See id. (arguing that Griswold, Roe v. Wade, and Eisenstadt stand for the 
proposition that disagreement with or disapproval of another’s moral choices cannot 
justify intrusion on fundamental rights). 
 152. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 144, at 762 (noting that, generally, in order for 
a regulation to qualify as “narrowly tailored,” a less restricted means must not exist). 
 153. See Clapper v. Harvey, 716 A.2d 1271, 1273 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (declaring 
that, in making a determination of the best interest of the child, the court must 
consider any relevant factors that may affect the child’s physical, intellectual, moral, 
and spiritual well being). 
 154. See HULL, supra note 149, at 14 (asserting that a gestational motherhood 
standard may violate the rights of intended couples).  The Constitution, however, 
may permit certain restrictions on non-coital reproductions, specifically laws that 
would require disclosure of the gamete donor’s identity if requested and laws that 
would assure “free, informed entry” into reproductive contracts.  Id. 
 155. See infra Part IIC2 (arguing that a gestational motherhood standard in a 
gestational surrogacy situation would violate the Fourteenth Amendment); U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that the states cannot deny any person equal 
protection of the laws); see also Christina DeJong & Christopher E. Smith, Equal 
Protection, Gender, and Justice at the Dawn of a New Century, 14 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 
123, 126-29 (1999) (noting that Congress originally passed the Fourteenth 
Amendment to protect recently emancipated slaves from racial prejudice, but, in 
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Protection Clause requires that courts examine any law that treats 
men and women differently under a heightened level of scrutiny, 
known as intermediate scrutiny.156  To survive intermediate scrutiny, 
the state must prove that the law serves an important governmental 
objective and that there is a substantial relation between the law and 
that objective.157 
A gestational motherhood standard treats men and women who are 
similarly situated differently, which triggers an Equal Protection 
analysis.158  In traditional birth situations, mothers and fathers are not 
similarly situated because of biological differences between the 
sexes.159  In contrast, in some gestational surrogacy arrangements 
where the intended parents each supply the genetic material for the 
child and neither parent bears the child, mothers and fathers are 
similarly situated.160  Each parent contributes only genetic material to 
the production of an embryo, which a third party gestates.161  
                                                          
recent decades, the Court has expanded the doctrine of Equal Protection to protect 
against discrimination based on gender). 
 156. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny to a law that prohibited the sale of “near beer” to men under twenty-one and 
women under eighteen); see also ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 129, at § 14.3 
(explaining that, aside from intermediate scrutiny, which applies to gender-based 
distinctions, the Supreme Court has also articulated two other standards of review:  
strict scrutiny and rational basis).  Strict scrutiny is the most difficult standard to meet 
and the Court applies it to laws that draw distinctions based on race or national 
origin, whereas the Court applies rational basis review, the lowest standard, to general 
economic laws.  Id. 
 157. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70-75 (1981) (finding that a law 
that required men but not women to register for the draft survived intermediate 
scrutiny because the differential treatment of men and women substantially served a 
sufficiently important goal—the raising and deploying of armies capable of combat); 
Craig, 429 U.S. at 200-10 (striking down a law that prohibited men under twenty-one 
from buying an alcoholic beverage that women under twenty-one could buy because 
the differential treatment of men and women was not substantially related to the 
state’s goal of improving traffic safety). 
 158. See Storrow, supra note 13, at 634-35 (suggesting that the genetic provider 
standard may also offend the Constitution in states where the presumption of 
paternity exists because it would permit genetics to determine motherhood while 
genetics could not override the presumption to determine fatherhood). 
 159. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based 
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 316 
(noting that historically, the act of giving birth provided clear proof of motherhood, 
while no similarly conclusive means existed to prove paternity). 
 160. See Soos v. Super. Ct., 897 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (overturning 
an Arizona surrogacy statute that deemed the surrogate the legal mother of any child 
born to her on Equal Protection grounds because it permitted a genetic father to 
rebut the presumption of paternity with proof of genetic relationship, but offered no 
rebuttal to a genetic mother); see also Hofheimer, supra note 36, at 597 (arguing that 
the Equal Protection Clause is triggered in situations absent pregnancy as the 
distinguishing factor between expectant fathers and mothers). 
 161. See RAE, supra note 136, at 17-18 (noting that in traditional birth situations, 
fertile couples are differently situated because fertile women have two aspects of 
fertility, the genetic component and the gestational component, while fertile men 
have only the genetic component). 
24
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol14/iss1/5
2006] ARE YOU MY MOTHER? 155 
Applying a gestational surrogacy standard in Pennsylvania would 
permit a genetic father a slim but legitimate claim of legal parentage 
by rebutting the presumption of paternity if the surrogate is 
married162 or by establishing paternity based on a genetic relationship 
if she is not married.163  However, no such opportunity exists for a 
genetic mother to establish legal motherhood as against a gestational 
mother.164  Therefore, a gestational motherhood standard, as applied 
in Pennsylvania, would treat men and women differently.165 
Thus, in order for its surrogacy standard to survive a court’s 
heightened scrutiny, Pennsylvania must have an important state 
interest that is substantially related to a gestational motherhood 
standard.166  Pennsylvania could argue that the state has an important 
interest in furthering the bond between gestator and child or that 
gestation, rather than genetics, creates motherhood.167  However, the 
Supreme Court has adamantly rejected arguments based on sex 
stereotyping.168  Since there is no evidence that a child benefits more 
from his relationship with a non-genetically-related surrogate than 
with his own genetic parents, that justification hinges on sex-based 
stereotypes.169  Therefore, a court likely would reject that argument 
                                                          
 162. See Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 181 n.9 (Pa. 1997) (holding that the 
presumption of paternity can be rebutted by proof that the husband had no access to 
the wife at the time of conception or that he was infertile); see also Commonwealth 
ex rel. Savruk v. Derby, 344 A.2d 624, 627 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (recognizing that 
courts can consider the husband’s and wife’s testimonies as to whether or not there 
was “access” at the time of conception). 
 163. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4343 (2004) (stating that genetic testing can 
establish paternity if the woman who gives birth is not married and no man has acted 
as a father to the child). 
 164. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (proving that Pennsylvania’s 
presumption of maternity is currently irrebuttable). 
 165. See Hofheimer, supra note 36, at 596-97 (noting that a standard that favors 
the gestational mother and the genetic father is discriminatory and requires 
heightened scrutiny). 
 166. See id. (noting that the states that fail to meet the burden of intermediate 
scrutiny cannot provide certain rights to genetic fathers and deny those same rights to 
genetic mothers). 
 167. See Garrison, supra note 115, at 914-15 (noting that arguments in favor of 
recognizing the legal parentage of a gestational mother do not rest on contract or 
procreative liberty analysis; instead, they focus on the significance of the gestational 
bond). 
 168. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (invalidating a 
statutory scheme that provided for benefits to all wives of military men, but 
conditioned the receipt of benefits by husbands of military women because the law’s 
justification rested on stereotypes of the sexes); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 
(1975) (overturning a child support law that required child support payments for 
boys until age twenty-one but for women only until eighteen, because the law relied 
on sex stereotypes to justify disparate treatment of men and women). 
 169. See Hill, supra note 26, at 393-94, 403 (noting that, while parental bonding 
within the first year is tantamount to a child’s development, research has failed to 
show that a child benefits more from bonding with a gestational mother than with a 
non-biologically-connected one). 
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and find that Pennsylvania lacks an interest sufficiently important and 
substantially related to the motherhood standard to overcome the 
court’s heightened scrutiny.170  As a result, a gestational motherhood 
standard would likely fail Equal Protection analysis. 
III.  THE FUTURE OF SURROGACY IN PENNSYLVANIA 
Pennsylvania should codify its approach to surrogacy contracts in 
order to protect the rights of intended parents.171  Some 
commentators believe that Pennsylvania’s current system is adequate, 
but the emergence and outcome of J.F. suggests otherwise.  As it 
stands, the state fails to protect the rights of intended parents.172  The 
legislature should enact guidelines to govern surrogacy arrangements 
and to guide future courts in their surrogacy analyses.173 
A.  Enactment of a Modified Version of the Uniform Parentage Act 
Pennsylvania’s statute should resemble the UPA in several ways.174  
First, it should recognize the intended parents as the legal parents of a 
child born through a surrogacy arrangement.175  To avoid situations 
like that seen in J.F., the statute specifically should require the 
identification of two parents.176  However, the statute should differ 
from the UPA in that it should recognize intended parents whether or 
not the intended parents are married.177  Requiring marriage of 
                                                          
 170. See Hofheimer, supra note 36, at 597 (arguing that it would be nearly 
impossible for the government to meet the heightened level of scrutiny without 
relying on sex stereotyping to justify the disparate treatment of men and women). 
 171. See J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 32 (2004) (recommending that the 
legislature take action to enact surrogacy legislation and prevent cases like this one 
from appearing before the courts). 
 172. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (noting that because the 
legislature has not codified the Department of Health’s assisted birth procedure, it is 
not binding on the courts).  Although courts can choose to apply it, the Department 
of Health cannot require them to do so nor can it require them to uphold its 
application during a surrogacy dispute.  Id. 
 173. See Lilienthal, supra note 69, at *1 (acknowledging the assertions of notable 
Pennsylvania attorneys that the facts of the Bimber case are such that the case will not 
affect the outcome of future surrogacy cases in Pennsylvania). 
 174. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801 prefatory cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 
360-61 (2000 & Supp. 2004) (advocating for a law that favors intended parents and 
recognizes a surrogacy contract as enforceable as long as a court pre-approves it). 
 175. See id. § 801 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 362 (asserting that, because the advancement of 
science virtually guarantees that gestational surrogacy agreements will continue, a 
standard that enforces pre-approved surrogacy contracts will promote the public 
policy goals of stability and fairness). 
 176. See J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 19-23 (refusing to enforce the surrogacy contract 
where it only provided for one legal parent of the triplets). 
 177. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(b), 9B U.L.A. 362 (requiring that the 
intended parents be married and parties to the contract); see also RAE, supra note 
136, at 19 (concluding that there are no compelling reasons to recognize the rights of 
procreative freedom only in married couples). 
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intended parents would conflict with Pennsylvania’s recent willingness 
to circumvent marital requirements in family law issues.178  For 
example, Pennsylvania has recognized exceptions to marital 
requirements for gay couples, who are not legally permitted to 
marry.179  Simply requiring the identification of two parents would 
coincide with Pennsylvania’s expanding perception of the “family 
unit.”180  Further, this requirement would still protect the rights of 
the child because it would ensure two legal parents from whom the 
child could seek emotional and financial support.181 
Additionally, the Pennsylvania statute should require the receipt of 
a pre-conception order recognizing the contract as valid.182  This 
would permit the state to safeguard the interest of the child by 
predetermining the ability of the parties to fulfill their contractual 
roles and obligations.183  It also will deflect arguments centered on 
concerns about the rights of the gestational mother.184  The court in 
J.F. held that the contract conflicted with public policy because it 
allowed Bimber to sign away her parental rights without adequate 
                                                          
 178. See generally Maureen Cohon, Where the Rainbow Ends: Trying to Find a 
Pot of Gold for Same-Sex Couples in Pennsylvania, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 495 (2003) 
(noting that while Pennsylvania does not officially recognize same sex unions, some 
Pennsylvania courts permit gay couples to avail themselves of family law benefits such 
as second-parent adoption, custody and visitation rights, and domestic violence 
protection). 
 179. See In re Adoption of R.B.F, 803 A.2d 1195, 1202-03 (Pa. 2002) (permitting 
an exception to a statutory requirement that where one person seeks to adopt his or 
her domestic partner’s child, the parent and the person who wishes to adopt must be 
married to each other).  The court permitted a gay male to adopt his partner’s child 
because the state prohibited them from marrying, which the court found fell within a 
statutory exception involving a showing of “good cause” as to why the adopting 
couple had not met the statutory requirements.  Id. 
 180. See Shultz, supra note 159, at 344 (acknowledging the evolution of the 
“traditional family unit” due to divorce, remarriage, gay relationships, and unmarried 
cohabitation). 
 181. See Storrow, supra note 13, at 663 (asserting that a marital requirement is 
irrelevant because intended parents assume legal obligations to support their child 
through their status as legal parents, not through marriage). 
 182. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 364-65 (noting that the court-
approved pre-conception validation guards the interest of any potential child by 
ensuring that intended parents meet the requirements of adoptive parents); see also 
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (2004) (requiring the court to make twelve independent 
findings, including the intended parents’ fitness, prior to issuing the necessary pre-
conception court order). 
 183. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B) (requiring that the court find that intended 
parents meet the standard of fitness required of adoptive parents, that the parties 
entered the contract voluntarily, and that the surrogate has endured at least one prior 
pregnancy). 
 184. Cf. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211-12 (Ky. 
1986) (noting that where a court approves a pre-conception surrogacy contract, the 
court will necessarily have concluded that no one induced the surrogate into agreeing 
to surrender a child, but instead that the surrogate agreed to conceive and carry a 
child for others who will have parental rights). 
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time to consider them.185  However, a court’s validation of a surrogacy 
agreement prior to conception will effectively constitute a waiver of 
the surrogate’s parental rights.186  Furthermore, a pre-conception 
contract will defend against accusations that surrogacy contracts 
manipulate or exploit women.187  The pre-conception validation 
order also would require the court to conclude that all parties entered 
into the contract knowingly and without coercion.188  Such an order 
would demonstrate the surrogate’s ability to make knowing and 
rational decisions regarding her own body.189 
Finally, the UPA also suggests that, where there is no court-validated 
surrogacy agreement, traditional parentage statutes should prevail.190  
In Pennsylvania, this would result in the court identifying the birth 
mother as the legal mother and her husband or the genetic father as 
the legal father.191  This would serve to encourage parties to surrogate 
agreements to seek court approval and would thereby protect the 
interests of all parties.192  In order to bypass any potential Equal 
Protection issues, however, the state should enact a maternity law that 
would allow a rebuttal of the birth mother presumption.193 
                                                          
 185. See J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 22 (2004) (applying the public policy 
concerns behind the creation of mandatory waiting periods in adoption situations). 
 186. See Alexander, supra note 37, at 425-26 (arguing that a court’s pre-
conception validation prevents the surrogate from ever acquiring rights and thereby 
shields her from any existing baby-selling statute). 
 187. See generally Katherine B. Lieber, Note, Selling the Womb: Can the Feminist 
Critique of Surrogacy Be Answered?, 68 IND. L.J. 205 (1992) (summarizing arguments 
against surrogacy that focus on potential harms to the perception of women and to 
the feminist movement altogether, and ultimately concluding that a statute should 
address these concerns). 
 188. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803(b)(4) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 364 (2000 
& Supp. 2004) (requiring a court to find that all parties to the contract entered it 
freely and knowingly prior to certifying a pre-conception agreement). 
 189. See CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY 155-56 (1989) 
(asserting that arguments focusing on the surrogate’s welfare and rights ignore 
women’s “faculty of self-determination” and their ability to make informed, binding 
decisions about their bodies); see also Shultz, supra note 159, at 384 (arguing that if 
courts permit surrogates to shirk their contractual obligations, they will reinforce 
stereotypes of women as “unstable, as unable to make decisions and stick to them, 
and as necessarily vulnerable to their hormones and emotions”). 
 190. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 809(c), 9B U.L.A. 369 (indicating that even where 
a court finds a contract unenforceable, the intended parents may still be liable for 
support of the resulting child). 
 191. See supra Part IC (explaining that, under Pennsylvania law, a gestational 
mother and her husband are the legal parents of a child born to her, and if the 
gestational mother is not married, the genetic father has the opportunity to establish 
parentage). 
 192. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 809 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 362 (noting that even though 
this provision does not protect the intended parents, the provision does not prohibit 
surrogacy agreements).  The UPA seeks only to “regularize the parentage aspects of 
the science, not to regulate the practice of assisted reproduction.”  Id. 
 193. See Soos v. Super. Ct., 897 P.2d 1356, 1360-61 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) 
(declaring that where a parentage rebuttal is available to a genetic father but not to a 
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B.  Rejection of Commodification Concerns 
Pennsylvania’s statute should not prohibit payment to the surrogate 
for her services.194  States that prohibit payment to the surrogate cite 
concerns about baby-selling and commodification.195  Upon closer 
examination, permitting payment to surrogates in Pennsylvania would 
not conflict with Pennsylvania’s law against baby-selling.196  As 
previously mentioned, where a court approves a contract pre-
conception, the surrogate has no right to the child and therefore no 
ability to sell the child.197  As a result, the cited concerns do not apply. 
Furthermore, the argument against commodification relies on the 
notion that there are some goods or services that people should never 
exchange for money.198  However, commentator Richard Epstein 
dismisses this argument by stating that one person should not impose 
his or her moral belief about commodification onto others.199  
Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that the government cannot 
justify the passage of laws on morality alone.200   
The commodification argument generally rests on the notion that 
surrogacy exploits women.201  However, proving exploitation would 
require showing that the alleged victims all possessed a particular 
                                                          
genetic mother, the state has violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
 194. Cf. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(e), 9B U.L.A. 362 (permitting payment to the 
surrogate as consideration). 
 195. See 1980-1981 Ky. Op. Atty. Gen. 2-588 (1981) (declaring payments to a 
surrogate contrary to Kentucky’s strong public policy against the buying and selling of 
children). 
 196. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4305 (2004) (declaring that it is a misdemeanor to 
trade, barter, buy, sell, or deal in infant children); see also Ingram, supra note 16, at 
682 (explaining that the public policy concern against baby-selling stemmed from 
situations in which a single woman found herself unexpectedly pregnant and felt that 
she had no choice but to sell her baby). 
 197. See Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211-12 (Ky. 
1986) (distinguishing surrogacy from baby-selling by arguing that baby-selling statutes 
protect baby buyers from manipulating vulnerable mothers into surrendering their 
children, whereas court approved surrogacy agreements recognize that the surrogate 
does not risk such inducement because she has not yet conceived a child). 
 198. See Alan Wertheimer, Symposium on Coercion: An Interdisciplinary 
Examination of Coercion, Exploitation, and the Law: IV. Trans-substantive Themes: 
Exploitation and Commercial Surrogacy, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1215, 1218 (1997) 
(indicating that other goods or services to which states have applied the 
commodification argument are citizenship, human beings, and marriage rights). 
 199. See Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual 
Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2326 (1995) (dispelling the commodification 
argument and advocating for full enforcement of surrogacy contracts). 
 200. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 
(1992) (acknowledging that the law should protect universal liberties rather than 
mandate on the basis of individual moral codes). 
 201. See Hill, supra note 26, at 409 (noting that a common exploitation argument 
rests on the notion that women are somehow not free to make decisions regarding 
surrogacy). 
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vulnerability that rendered them incapable of turning down the 
exploitative offer.202  Women who become surrogates do not possess 
the same characteristics and they opt to become surrogates for a 
variety of different reasons.203  Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that 
all surrogates possess the same vulnerability.  Without a shared 
vulnerability, surrogacy contracts cannot be exploitative.204  Without 
the baby-selling or commodification arguments to support a 
restriction on payment to the surrogate, there remains no viable 
justification for prohibiting a gestational surrogate from receiving 
compensation for her valuable services.205 
CONCLUSION 
Last year, Pennsylvania courts addressed a gestational surrogacy 
dispute for the first time in J.F. v. D.B.  This case likely indicates the 
increasing popularity of surrogacy arrangements, as well as the need 
for guidelines in deciding these disputes.  The case possessed a 
complicated set of facts and represented the messy disputes that can 
arise from gestational surrogacy arrangements.  The judge in this case 
ultimately ruled that the gestational surrogate was the mother of the 
triplets she bore. 
However, neither future courts nor the Pennsylvania legislature 
should interpret the outcome of J.F. as favoring the adoption of a 
gestational motherhood standard for surrogacy situations in 
Pennsylvania.  The court named Bimber as the legal mother because 
of a fatal contract flaw unique to this case, not because of her role as 
gestator.  In addition, a gestational motherhood standard in 
Pennsylvania would conflict with the existing justifications behind the 
state’s paternity laws and existing policies.  Furthermore, a gestational 
surrogacy standard likely would fail constitutional analysis as applied 
in Pennsylvania because it would deny infertile parents their right to 
procreate.  It also would violate the Equal Protection Clause by 
                                                          
 202. See Havins & Dalessio, supra note 3, at 689 (noting that commercial 
surrogacy contracts are not exploitative because there is no evidence that a surrogacy 
contract exploits a given weakness in the surrogate). 
 203. See HELENA RAGONÉ, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: CONCEPTION IN THE HEART 54-
57 (1994) (describing the varying characteristics of surrogates interviewed and noting 
that they perceived their choice as an informed one, even where class inequities 
existed between intended parents and surrogates). 
 204. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785 (Cal. Rptr.2d 1993) (acknowledging 
an absence of significant data to indicate that surrogacy contracts lead to the 
exploitation of women); see also Andrews, supra note 101, at 2349-50 (concluding 
after interviewing over eighty parties to surrogacy agreements that the exploitation 
concerns were “rashly speculative”). 
 205. See Ingram, supra note 16, at 689-90 (arguing for compensation to the 
surrogate for considerations such as the surrogate’s discomfort, pain, and risk during 
pregnancy and birth, as well as the interruption of her own sexual activity). 
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denying genetic and intended mothers the same rights granted to 
genetic and intended fathers. 
Pennsylvania should adopt a surrogacy statute to prevent situations 
like that in J.F. from occurring in the future.  That statute should 
recognize intended parents as the legal parents of children born to 
surrogacy contracts.  However, because the state does have an interest 
in protecting the welfare of its children, the legislation should include 
specific regulations, such as court approval of pre-conception 
agreements.  Additionally, the statute should permit payment to the 
surrogate for her services. 
Ultimately, while J.F. was the first surrogacy case to reach 
Pennsylvania courts, it is unlikely that it will be the last.206  Whatever 
route the legislature chooses to take, it is vital that Pennsylvania 
implement a statute as soon as possible to protect future intended 
parents from the heartbreak associated with watching someone else 
raise their child. 
 
                                                          
 206. See Ingram, supra note 16, at 675 (noting the increasing popularity of 
gestational surrogacy arrangements). 
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